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LIMITATIONS ON THE REPLY
It might be argued that these nonprofit charitable, educational
and research organizations with primarily noncommercial activi-
ties perform functions that may otherwise have to be performed by
the government, either local, state or national, and that, therefore,
they should not be subjected to the regulation in labor disputes
since government activities are not. However, recent labor strife
concerning teachers, nurses and sanitation workers illustrate the
very definite need in these areas for regulation of labor disputes.
Work stoppages in the governmental sector jumped from 42 in-
volving 12,000 workers in 1965 to 142 involving 105,000 workers
in 1966.20 Further, there is some question as to whether the gov-
ernments should or even would operate some of the activities en-
gaged in by some of the organizations over which the Board refused
to assert jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the Board should take jurisdiction over these
organizations, and, that, despite the Board's interpretation of the
Conference Report, it is perfectly free to do so. If necessary the
Congress should consider empowering the Board to do so.
PENDER R. McEELROY
Pleadings-Limitations on the Reply
In Davis v. North Carolina State Highway Commission,1 the
North Carolina Supreme Court echoed a long standing notion about
the nature of the reply, which merits examination in light of the
proposed changes in the state's rules of civil procedure, as well as
present practice. The complaint in Davis stated that the state high-
way commission had taken plaintiff's property on January 14, 1965,
when in fact it was not needed at that time. It was further alleged
that the taking was accomplished by means of false representations,
with intent to deceive plaintiffs and force them out before their
departure was necessary. Included was a prayer for 50,000 dollars
actual and 1,000,000 dollars punitive damages.2
Defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint alleg-
Men's Christian Association; there are many nonprofit research foundations
associated with colleges and universities.
1o U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 249 (88th Ed. 1967).
-271 N.C. 405, 156 S.E.2d 685 (1967).
2 Id. at 406-07, 156 S.E.2d at 686-87.
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ing false representations and asking for punitive damages. In their
answer, defendants admitted taking the property on January 14,
1965, and stated that they had deposited 15,500 dollars as their
estimate of the value of the property.' Plaintiffs filed a reply stating
that the property had actually been taken on April 24, 1967. They
alleged that defendants had pretended to take it on January 14, 1965,
pursuant to a scheme to induce them to leave so that the property
would deteriorate in value during the interim. Claiming they had
been defrauded out of the use of the property for two years, plain-
tiffs prayed for damages based on the fair market value of the
property on April 24, 1967, which they alleged to be 45,000 dollars.
The portions of the complaint pertaining to fraud and punitive
damages and the entire reply were ordered stricken. The trial court
held that the only issue to be tried was that of the value of the
property on January 14, 1965. From this ruling plaintiffs unsuccess-
fully appealed.4
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that since both the
allegations of the complaint and the reply were grounded in varia-
tions of intentional tort, the highway commission was clearly im-
mune from suit under the state Tort Claims Act.! By way of dictum
the court stated that, even if the reply was sufficient to state a cause
of action, it was properly stricken because the reply is a defensive
pleading and the cause of action must be stated in the complaint.'
Plaintiffs often have to contend with the problem of anticipatory
pleading in the complaint versus new affirmative matter in the reply.
Dicta such as that found in the principal case tend to perpetuate the
problem. It is said that "[t]he purpose of the reply is to deny such
allegations of the answer as plaintiff does not admit and to meet new
matter set up in the answer .... [i]t must be limited to an admission
or denial of the new matter set up in the answer."
7
Apparently, the two principal errors which the North Carolina
courts find in replies are (1) inconsistency with the complaint and
3 rd. at 407, 156 S.E.2d at 686-87.
'Id. at 407, 156 S.E.2d at 687.
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1963). Plaintiffs clearly lost the case on
the basis of this statute, and not the ruling on the reply. The commission
is only liable for negligence, and is not subject to suit except as provided
in the act. Ayscue v. Highway Comm'n, 270 N.C. 100, 153 S.E.2d 823 (1967),
Nello L. Teer Co. v. Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C. 1, 143 S.E.2d 247 (1965),
Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E.2d 121 (1965).
:271 N.C. 405, 409, 156 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1967).
Spain v. Brown, 236 N.C. 355, 357, 72 S.E.2d 918, 919 (1952).
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(2) attempts to state a cause of action, rather than to reply to alle-
gations of new matter in the answer. Such inconsistency is for-
bidden in North Carolina by statute,' and there is sufficient judicial
interpretation of the term to give meaning to the prohibition. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that inconsistency means
that the complaint and reply are contrary to one another, so that one
is necessarily false if the other is true.' Plaintiff's new matter may
be totally unconnected with the complaint as long as it is responsive
to defendant's answer.
10
The court in Davis made no mention of inconsistency. How-
ever, the facts of the case indicate that such an argument could
certainly have been made, since the complaint and the reply contained
conflicting allegations as to the date of the taking of plaintiffs'
property. Inconsistency has been found in instances where it was
not as clearly apparent as in Davis. In Miller v. Grimsley," plain-
tiff, suing defendant for cutting timber on plaintiff's land, admitted
in the complaint that his deed had reserved a portion of the land
to the use of defendant and described that portion to some extent.
When defendant answered setting up the deed, plaintiff's reply,
stating that the reservation in the deed was too vague for any pur-
pose, was stricken as inconsistent?2 Inconsistency as to theory of
the cause of action, however, is apparently permissible. The court
found no inconsistency in Berry v. Hyde Land & Lumber Company"
where the complaint alleged that defendant's canal blocked plaintiff's
ingress and egress (tort). Defendant answered that he had a con-
tract with plaintiff to dig the canal. Plaintiff replied that the canal
was not dug according to the terms of the agreement (contract).
It is much easier to determine the boundaries of consistency, how-
ever, than it is to tell when a reply has lost the defensive character
deemed essential by the North Carolina courts. A most striking
contrast to the principal case came in Gilliam Furniture Incorporated
v. Bentwood Incorporated.4 Here plaintiff brought suit on a note,
claiming defendant had guaranteed it. Defendant answered that
the alleged guarantee was made to "save face" for one of the com-
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-141 (1953).
o Scott v. Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 247, 69 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1952).
10 Boyette v. Vaughan, 79 N.C. 528, 530 (1878).
11220 N.C. 514, 17 S.E.2d 642 (1941).
"2Id. at 515, 17 S.E.2d at 643-644.
183 N.C. 384, 111 S.E. 707 (1922).
14267 N.C. 119, 147 S.E,2d 612 (1966).
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pany's officers and that, being without consideration, it was of no
legal effect. Plaintiff replied that if the guarantee was not autho-
rized, it was fraudulently executed. Plaintiff was later given leave
to add to his reply "certain additional facts" which he claimed to
be material to the controversy. The court made essentially the same
statement as in Davis about the necessity of alleging causes of action
in the complaint, but then proceeded to treat the reply as an amended
complaint, ordering the pleadings to be recast later.'" Also varying
somewhat from the holding in Davis was Bryan v. Acme Maim-
facturing Company."' In an action to cancel notes due, the complaint
alleged delivery of useless cotton fertilizer instead of the desired
tobacco fertilizer. Defendant answered that cotton fertilizer was
ordered and included a copy of the order form. Plaintiff was allowed
to allege in his reply, not only fraud in procuring the order, but
also misbranding of the product in violation of a statute. This was
held merely to amplify the complaint.17 It could be said that plaintiff
in Davis should have been entitled under Furniture Company to
have his "certain additional facts" concerning the alleged later taking
and scheme to be treated also by the court as an amended complaint.
It is also arguable that the allegations that these same events, which
occurred subsequent to the original complaint, should be construed
as merely amplifying the complaint as in Bryan.
Even after the adoption of the proposed new rules of civil pro-
cedure in North Carolina, plaintiffs will have to contend with a
degree of uncertainty about what is to be allowed in the reply and
whether their errant replies will be stricken or simply treated as
amended complaints. The question is whether the matter is not
really one of form rather than substance. The statutory provision
which grants judges power to permit amendment of any pleading
at any stage 8 and the North Carolina Supreme Court's statement
-- Id. at 121, 147 S.E.2d at 614. See also Every v. Every, 265 N.C. 506,
144 S.E.2d 603 (1965) where no defects were found although plaintiff's
complaint alleged domestic difficulties as grounds for alimony and in reply
to defendant's defense of a separation agreement she alleged fraud and want
of consideration.
209 N.C. 720, 184 S.E. 471 (1936). See also the earlier case of Win-
stead v. Acme Mfg. Co., 207 N.C. 110, 176 S.E. 304 (1934) where the same
attorney for the plaintiff, against the same defendant got into difficulty with
his pleading and was not even allowed to amend his complaint.
"7 Bryan v. Acme Mfg. Co., 209 N.C. 720, 722, 184 S.E. 471, 472 (1936).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953).
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that such power is inherent even in the absence of statute 9 support
the desirability and propriety of denominating all new affirmative
matter in the reply as an amendment to the complaint.
The proposed new rules limit the scope of the problem consider-
ably since a reply is only allowed in response to a counterclaim
denominated as such, or when ordered by the court.2" Thus, unless
the courts hold contrary to the apparent intention of the new rules,
the number of instances when plaintiff may run afoul of North
Carolina restrictions on the reply will be sharply reduced. Noting,
however, that under the new rules, the complaint may contain claims
which are alternative, inconsistent, or unrelated,2 the striking of
the reply as not being defensive seems to find even less justification.
WILLIAM S. GEIMER
Taxation-Reintroduction of the Premium Payment Plan?
In Revenue Ruling 67-4631 the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue has taken the position that when a husband transfers all inci-
dents of ownership of an insurance policy to his wife more than
three years prior to his death, but continues to pay the premiums
until his death, the premiums paid within the -last, three years are
paid in contemplation of death and represent a transfer of an in-
terest in the policy. The interest transferred is measured by the
proportion the amount of premiums so paid bears to the total amount
of premiums paid; therefore, the proportionate value of the in-
surance bought by these premiums is includible in his gross estate
under section 2035.2 Arguably, this ruling is a reintroduction of the.
old "premium payment" plan rejected by Congress in 1954.
In making this ruling, the Commissioner could have taken two
"' Gilliam Furniture Inc. v. Bentwood Inc., 267 N.C. 119, 120, 147 S.E.2d
612, 613 (1966)." PROPOSED N.C. RuLEs CIv. PROc. 7(a) (1967).
"'PROPOSED N.C. RULES CIV. PROC. 8(e) (1967).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967 IN'T. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035. For example, if A buys an insurance
policy worth one hundred thousand dollars and pays eight thousand dollars
in premiums over a four year period, with six thousand dollars being paid
over the last three years prior to death, the Commissioner would include in
his gross estate three-fourths of the value of the policy or seventy-five
thousand dollars, and not the six thousand paid for the premiums,
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